Abstract: RFID systems have many security risks as an insecure wireless communication channel exists between tag and reader. Kulseng et al. have proposed several lightweight secure search protocols for low-cost systems: the basic protocol and the synchronisation-based protocol. To attack these two protocols successfully, the adversary needs to eavesdrop on the communication channel between reader and tag, and intercept and tamper with the exchanged messages. We show that the basic protocol cannot resist the tracking attack. The synchronisation-based protocol is vulnerable to the tracking attack and a kind of desynchronisation attack.
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless Automatic Identification and Data Capture (AIDC) technology for identifying a product, animal or person by using radio signals (Juels, 2006) . Due to the widespread distribution of RFID tags as well as the tag limitations in terms of the circuitry (computation power), storage and power consumption, it is a great challenge to design an efficient and secure RFID authentication protocol (Lόpez, 2008) . One important functionality that an RFID system should provide is tag search, where a reader can detect if a particular tag is present or not. Tag search approaches pose challenge to security and privacy. Surprisingly, the problem of RFID search has not been widely addressed in the literature despite the availability of search capabilities in commercial RFID products (Tan et al., 2008) .
Some RFID systems (Dimitriou, 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Tsudik, 2006) are based on a central database which is dependent on a reliable connection between an RFID reader and the central database. Tan et al. (2008) have proposed a more flexible authentication protocol that provides comparable protection without the need for a central database and provides a search protocol for RFID tags with security and privacy protection. The solutions in Tan et al. (2008) are based on hash function and are expensive for low-cost RFID systems (Kulseng et al., 2009) . Kulseng et al. (2009) have proposed several lightweight secure search protocols. Their schemes are built on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) (Menezes et al., 2001) and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) (Suh and Devadas, 2007) , which are very efficient for implementation in low-cost tags. They use LFSR to generate random numbers for the encryption of communication and rely on PUF to authenticate the identity of tags. The authors claim that the proposed protocols are able to prevent the leakage of tag information and the adversary from generating fake messages to impersonate the RFID reader or tag. However, in this paper, we show that the protocols in Kulseng et al. (2009) are vulnerable to tracking attack and desynchronisation attack. The adversary eavesdrops on the communication channel between reader and tag and intercepts or tampers the exchanged messages in order to trace the target tag or desynchronise the stored data on the reader (tag) side.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce system model and threat model. In Section 3, we review the basic protocol. The security analysis of the basic protocol is presented in Section 4. We review the proposed synchronisationbased protocol in Section 5. The vulnerability analysis of this synchronisation-based protocol is discussed in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
System background

System model
A typical RFID system architecture (Thornton et al., 2006) consists of three key components: RFID tags, RFID readers and a backend server (see Figure 1) . The reader sends a radio signal to the tag and listens to the tag's response. The tag detects this signal and replies with its identification. The reader and the tag communicate with each other through the wireless network, whereas the communication channel between reader and database can be wired or wireless. Usually, we assume that the communication between server and reader is secure due to the usage of advanced encryption scheme. The wireless communication channel between reader and tag is not secure, and an adversary can eavesdrop on it. The adversary can also intercept or even modify and inject the communication messages. 
Threat model
RFID technology has been widely used in numerous applications, ranging from manufacturing, logistics, transportation, warehouse inventory control, supermarket checkout counters, to many emerging applications (Berbain et al., 2009) . RFID systems may face many threats which are launched by all kinds of attackers. These attackers may be active or passive. The construction of formal RFID security and privacy frameworks is fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems.
Dolev-Yao intruder model (Dolev and Yao, 1983 ) is the classical model used to analyse security protocols. Under this model, the adversary may have full control over the network. The adversary can eavesdrop on all messages exchanged between reader and tag, modify or block any message sent from reader to tag or vice versa, and may inject its own modified messages making them look like they have been sent from tag or reader. Additionally, there is an assumption that the adversary can observe whether an agent has successfully completed its run (van Deursen and Radomirović, 2009) when we analyse RFID protocols. The representative adversary models for RFID protocol analysis can be found in Vaudenay (2007) , Juels and Weis (2007) , Paise and Vaudenay (2008) and Deng et al. (2010) .
Review of lightweight secure search protocol: a basic protocol
In this section, we review the basic protocol proposed in Kulseng et al. (2009) . The following notations are used throughout this paper:
• ID T , the identity of target tag which is a q-bit length integer such that 1 ≤ ID T ≤ 2 q .
• K, the shared secret key between reader and target tag whose length is also q-bit.
Each tag shares a different key with the reader.
, a random permutation function whose input and output are both q-bit integers. L function is treated as a random generator and is constructed using LFSR. The construction of L function is public.
•
, a random permutation function whose operation range is [1, 2 q ]. P function is constructed by PUF.
• G n , the greeting from reader to tag in the current round, where n is the round index with the initial value 1.
• G n+1 , the greeting used in the next round which is computed from G n+1 = P(G n ).
• R n , a random number generated by the reader to mask ID T .
As illustrated in Figure 2 , the basic protocol consists of two phases: set-up phase and search phase. 
Set-up phase
In this phase, the reader and all the tags are preloaded with some secret information. The reader and the target tag share three items: ID T , K and L. The tag, besides the three items, also stores function P. While the reader contains two greeting numbers: G n and G n+1 .
Search phase
The details of steps for search phase are described as follows:
1 Reader R generates a random number R n and computes
Then reader broadcasts the query message
2 Upon receiving this query, each tag derives R n from n T R ID ⊕ with its own ID T .
Then, it derives
. If the derived K equals the value stored by the tag, the tag can be certain that this query is looking for it. Only the target tag has the correct ID T and only it can derive R n and verify K successfully. The target tag
Other tags will discard this query. Then it computes G n+1 = P(G n ) and G n+2 = P(G n+1 ) using the P function. It also calculates two sequential random numbers as 
Security analysis of the basic protocol
In this section, we perform the vulnerability analysis of the basic protocol under the Dolev-Yao intruder model. We present a kind of tracking attack which breaks the tag location privacy. The attack process consists of two phases which are shown in Figure 3 as I and II. ( )))) 
Second phase
Now the (n+1)-th search session takes place, the adversary operates as a man in the middle. In this case, by checking the verification result of the reader that whether the derived 2 n G + is equal to the stored value, the attacker can easily identify the tag that it had monitored in the first phase from large number of tags and, thus, successfully perform a tracking attack.
After these two phases, if the attacker wants to continue tracking the target tag, then it needs to monitor the communication between the reader and the tag. Because the messages stored by the reader have been updated into In this section, we show that the synchronisation-based protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack and desynchronisation attack. The attack steps are the same as attack on the basic protocol which are shown in Figure 5 . In the first phase, a normal n-th session takes place. The adversary intercepts the message In the second phase, the (n+1)-th session takes place. In this session, the adversary also operates as a man in the middle. Firstly, the reader broadcasts the request message 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed two lightweight secure search protocols for low-cost RFID systems. These two protocols are the basic protocol and the synchronisation-based protocol. We have demonstrated that the basic protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack, and the synchronisation-based protocol is not secure against tracking attack and desynchronisation attack. Both these attacks are caused by the linearity operation ⊕ . Our work shows that it may be quite unsafe using only simple bitwise operations to achieve RFID security under powerful adversary model. The security of RFID protocols must be proved with careful cryptanalysis. It is a challenge to design a secure protocol for low-cost RFID systems without using strong cryptographic algorithms such as hash function and symmetric encryption (Cao et al., 2009 ).
